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Abstract—As energy markets begin clearing at sub-hourly 
rates, their interaction with load control systems becomes a 
potentially important consideration. A simple model for the 
control of thermal systems using market-based power 
distribution strategies is proposed, with particular attention to 
the behavior and dynamics of electric building loads and 
distribution-level power markets.  Observations of dynamic 
behavior of simple numerical model are compared to that of an 
aggregate continuous model.  The analytic solution of the 
continuous model suggests important deficiencies in each.  The 
continuous model provides very valuable insights into how one 
might design such load control system and design the power 
markets they interact with.  We also highlight important 
shortcomings of the continuous model which we believe must 
be addressed using discrete models. 
Index Terms—power system modeling, power system 
economics, power demand, adaptive control, load shedding, 
load modeling 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The advent of sub-hourly energy markets, such as the 
New York Independent System Operator’s (NYISO) 5-
minute clearing time for hub and zone markets, has brought 
the time-scale of market price fluctuations within the 
operational time-scale of a significant fraction of load 
controls and building energy management systems. The 
commercial and residential sectors account for roughly 2/3 
of the total load in the North America and their price 
response behavior can be a very significant factor in the 
fluctuation of load at such a time-scale.  Recent studies of 
power price dynamics [1] [2] [3] provide valuable insights 
into the behavior of power markets as it affects the interplay 
between supply control and price, but they generally fail to 
capture that of demand control and price fluctuation at the 
time-scale that sub-hourly energy markets could operate in.  
Additionally, a great deal more attention is devoted to 
understanding and stimulating the response of demand at 
times when prices are well above average, especially in the 
context of the mitigation of market power exerted by 
suppliers [4] [5] [6]. This is of particular concern to those 
who suggest markets presenting defects must be explicitly 
mitigated [7] [8].  Unfortunately, relatively little is known 
about the role of loads when prices are below normal, when 
they can act then to enhance their response during times of 
high energy prices. 
In exploring the electrodynamic characteristics of 
electric transmission networks, an important step was made 
when it was demonstrated that using price signals to affect 
energy imbalance regulation either by frequency or ACE 
results in stable control [9].  However, once again more 
attention has been given to the dynamic interaction between 
the system as whole and the energy supply resources 
allocated and dispatched under the influence of market 
forces than has been given to that of loads.  In part, this is 
caused by the lack of sufficiently detailed models that can 
couple load behavior in response to system signals such as 
price over sub-hourly time-scales.  But there has historically 
been a lack of interest in load models working at the minute 
time-scale because of 1) the traditional belief in the power 
industry that the load is a boundary condition considered 
relatively constant within the context of system dynamics, 
2) the purpose of regulation is to follow the load rather than 
include it in the process, and 3) the introduction of such 
models brings about a degree of computational intensity not 
previously considered achievable in any practical setting.  In 
the context of this paper, we consider only the latter in the 
context of two possible remedies, which in time contribute 
to overcoming the former two.  The first is that the 
availability of high-performance computing to grid 
operators can be reasonably expected to bring down barrier 
to load modeling, and the second is that approaches may 
exist that permit modeling the aggregate dynamic behavior 
of a large number of discrete load control strategies within 
the extant computational constraints. 
The use of market-based strategies to control loads in 
buildings is not a new idea.  It is based on the widely 
accepted theory that economic negotiation strategies give 
rise to an emergent optimal allocation of limited resources, 
in this case, optimal in the sense of globally cost-minimal or 
locally profit maximal.  Its application to automation 
systems was initially proposed in the context of allocating 
computing resources [10] and later extended to building 
controls [11]. 
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In this study we examine first a numerical model to 
elucidate the basic behaviors of a market-based electric 
power distribution system, where demand acts as a full and 
equal partner with supply in determining price, and where 
the model of demand control incorporates some of these 
bidding and response strategies. The model is then 
generalized into an analytical model that allows us to 
examine the influence of specific parameters on the total 
cost of operating the system. A discussion on the necessity 
of tailoring the bidding strategy to the market dynamics 
follows.  
II. ITERATIVE MODEL 
This model considers the condition in which we control 
the heating of a building. Of course, the results apply for a 
model of air conditioning, water-heating, etc.  Auxiliary 
sources of heat not participating in the bidding strategy, 
such as internal gains and solar gains, are not considered. A 
simple model for simulating the bidding strategy consists of 
two iterative equations; one to determine the bid price, the 
other to determine the temperature of the building. At every 
time step, the bid price is compared to a market price, and 
energy is consumed if the bid is greater than the market 
price, resulting in an increased temperature in the building. 
The bidding strategy is defined by a linear dependence on 
the temperature T with hard cut-offs at Tmax and Tmin, the 
boundaries where energy is never consumed and always 
consumed, respectively. These boundaries ensure that the 
temperature stays within a predefined range regardless of 
the market price and thus protect the systems from damage 
and occupants from discomfort. The definition of the bid 
price B for the current temperature T is then 
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where P0 is the recent average price of power and a is a 
positive parameter that determines the level of comfort 
desired (small values of a giving the lowest comfort and 
large values giving the highest comfort).  This relationship 
is schematically depicted in Fig. 1 and can be used for 
bidding based on observed temperature conditions as well as 
for adjusting thermostat setpoints in response to market 
clearing prices. 
The unit quantity of energy q(t) consumed by a single 
heating unit is then 
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where P(t) is the market price. The energy is constantly 
consumed until the next clearing of the market, when the 
value of q(t) is updated again1. The temperature change at 
                                                          
1 This is true only in this idealized model.  In real systems, q(t) will also 
change when T goes outside the allowed range of [Tmin, Tmax] and the 
the time t of a building with a single heating unit is then 
defined as  
 
( )outTtTRtqdt
tdT −−= )()()( α  , (3) 
where T is offset by the setpoint temperature so that T = 0 
when P(t) = P0, α is the heating rate of the building, and R 
the natural heat loss rate of the building when the outside 
temperature is Tout (considered constant in this model and 
also offset by the setpoint). Equations (1-3) are iteratively 
evaluated for every clearing of the market, taken at 1/10 
hour intervals. The cost C(t) of heating the building up to 
the time t is defined as 
∫= t dxxQxPtC
0
)()()( . (4) 
The last parameter that needs to be defined is the 
market price. To compare the behavior of a market-based 
system a fluctuation market price is compared to a system, 
operating with a constant price by calculating the cost of 
operating each. In general, the market price is determined by 
the collective effect of all the bids and thus, the market price 
can exhibit very complex behavior, influencing the total cost 
in unexpected ways. In this, case we are considering the 
behavior of a single bidder, presumably in the presence of 
many other bidders, and that lone bidder does not 
significantly influence the behavior of the market.  
Consequently we will take the market price P as an 
exogenous input, which is independent of the bid, B.   
 
setpoint hysteresis is reached.  For our purposes, it is convenient to not 
consider this situation. 
P0 
0 
Tmax Tmin 
a 
Temperature 
Price 
Fig. 1: Relationship in thermostatic loads between temperature deviation 
from desired indoor temperature and energy price.  The slope a and the 
values of TMIN  and TMAX are controlled by the consumer and determine both 
the bidding strategy and the sensitivity of the load to energy price.  Larger 
values of a improve comfort but reduce economy.  Smaller values of a with 
larger values of TMIN  and TMAX  result in greater demand elasticity. 
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It is most instructive to study the effect of the specific 
effect of price fluctuations compared to a constant price, so 
the market price is taken to be a sine function. The 
amplitude and frequency of the sine function can be 
changed with respect to other parameters to illustrate the 
major contributions of the fluctuations on cost. Certainly a 
single sine function is far from representing a real market 
price evolution.  Nonetheless, most market time-series can 
be represented as sums of sine functions, such as a Fourier 
series, and in that sense, our conclusions retain generality. 
The time-series behavior of the key temperature, load, 
and bid variables when the price is constant is shown in Fig. 
2. The temperature always converges to the desired setpoint; 
with the bid price always higher or lower than the market 
price depending on temperature, as appropriate. When 
equilibrium is reached, the temperature undergoes periodic 
fluctuations in a manner similar to a standard thermostats. 
When the temperature is high enough, the bid price is lower 
than the market price and no energy is consumed. This 
remains so until the temperature is low enough to generate a 
bid higher or equal to the market price, at which point the 
temperature increases and the cycle starts again.   This 
behavior is typical of a standard thermostat that is not price 
sensitive, but also occurs when the clearing price has a zero 
variance over time, and can be further force by the customer 
by setting the thermostat’s parameter a to a very large 
number (indicating that maximum comfort is desired). 
Naturally, the time-series behavior of the system is not 
as simple when the price is fluctuating and the effect on 
total cost can be very different depending on the frequency 
of the market price fluctuations relative to the time-constant 
of the building’s heat loss. The market price is defined as 
P(t) = A sin(ωt); the period of the market price, tP = 2π/ω; 
and the relaxation time of the temperature of the building, 
tR = 1/R (defined as the time needed to lower the 
temperature to 1/e of its initial value). Fig. 3 shows the 
cumulative cost for four different market conditions. First, 
the constant price is shown, where the cost is constantly 
accumulated, as expected. Second, the market is such that tP 
> tR. Third, tP = tR, where large temperature oscillations 
occur since the heat loss occur on the same time-scale as the 
market price evolution.  In this case the bid price stays low 
for a long time before it is high enough to buy energy, at 
which point a large quantity of energy must be consumed to 
heat the building to a suitable level. Fourth, tP < tR, where 
very small temperature oscillations are present. The market 
price fluctuates fast enough so that it is always possible to 
buy energy at low prices and yet keeping the temperature at 
a desired level, thus resulting in generally low bid prices. 
The effect on accumulated cost of the different markets 
is also represented in Fig. 3. All scenarios are compared to 
the constant price market. It is clear the case where tP < tR 
offers the largest consistent cost savings, the highest 
comfort, and that these savings grow linearly in time. That 
market allows buildings to store heat so that the energy can 
be bought at only its lowest price. The other two fluctuating 
price scenarios do allow cost savings, but largely because 
the temperature is allowed to go down considerably when 
the price is high. This creates large temperature fluctuations 
that are undesirable. To the contrary, the case where tp < tR 
shows very fast temperature fluctuations to take advantage 
of the fast fluctuations of the market price. This is the 
essence of that strategy: efficient storing of heat that allows 
the high price peaks to be ignored. This will be impossible if 
the heat loss of the building occurs rapidly compared to the 
market price fluctuations. The control by design of these 
parameters is thus paramount to successful implementation 
of a market-based bidding strategy. 
III. CONTINUOUS MODEL 
We now consider a continuous model for the aggregate 
power Q(t), which will allow the analytical study of the 
interplay of the different parameters. We recognize two 
important simplifying assumptions here that are not true in 
reality, but that we must accept to gain important insights.  
First, we are assuming that prices change continuously, 
which in reality they do not.  This is an assumption that has 
been made previously in important models, such as the 
Black-Scholes model [12] for option pricing without 
significantly detracting from the insights gained, or indeed 
from the useful significance of the result.  Second we also 
assume that power consumption varies continuously, which 
at the level of end-use loads is certainly not the case either.  
Nevertheless, while this model may deviate in important 
ways from reality at the level of individual loads, it is 
expected to provide a relatively accurate depiction of the 
system behavior in the aggregate. 
The two equations of interest are now 
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, (5) 
where the parameter γ  is introduced to convert the 
difference between the bid price and the market price into a 
change of power, absorbing the constants of the other 
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Fig. 2: Temperature, quantity and bid price evolution when the price is
constant. The key parameters are a = 0.2, P0 = 30, T0 = 25, R = 0.007, 
Tmin = 20, Tmax = 30.  The constant price P = 30 is indicated by the dashed
line. 
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variables on the right side of the first equation in (5).  The 
parameter b describes the heat gain rate of the building 
when energy is consumed, and r, the heat loss rate of the 
building to the outside. All these parameters are positive. 
The market price P(t) will have the form 
)sin()( 0 tAPtP ω+=  , (6) 
and two cases will be considered; one where the price is 
constant (A=0) and one where the price fluctuates (A≠0). 
The cost difference between these two cases will then be 
determined. 
 
First, the case where P(t) = P0 is solved. Equations (5) 
form a system of non-homogeneous differential equations 
that can be solved by the method of undetermined 
coefficients[13]. 
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Fig. 3: Effect of ω and R on system dynamics and cost. R=0.007 in all 
simulations, a = 0.2, P0 varies the average of T at 25, Tmin = 23 and Tmax = 
27. In graphs (a)-(d), the top plot shows the temperature and the bottom 
plot shows normalized energy and price. In (a) price P(t) = 25. In (b) price 
P(t) = sin(0.005t) s.t. tP > tR. In (c) price P(t) = sin(0.05t) s.t. tP ≈ tR. In (d)
price P(t) = sin(0.2t), tP < tR. In (e) are the cumulative cost for the 
conditions of (a)-(d).  
TPWRS-_____-2006  5 
 
,)(
)(
21
21
21
2
2
1
1
tt
out
tt
ecectT
T
b
reaceactQ
λλ
λλ
λλ
+=
−−−=
 (7) 
with  
( ) ( )abrrabrr 4
2
1,4
2
1 2
2
2
1 −+−=−+−= λλ   (8) 
and the constants c1 and c2 can be found with initial 
conditions. The solution implies that after a transient period 
dominated by the exponential term, the system will settle to 
a constant steady state, dominated by the last term on the 
right of equations (7). The temperature will settle to T = 0. 
For P(t)=P0+Asin(ωt), the oscillation of the price will 
drive both Q(t) and T(t) into oscillation at the same 
frequency. The solution of the system is 
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and d1 and d2 can be found from initial conditions. Both Q(t) 
and T(t) converge to the same value as in the case where 
P(t) = P0, but there is now also an oscillation around that 
value produced by the sine functions. The oscillation of Q(t) 
and T(t) occurs at the same frequency as P(t), but with phase 
shifts, respectively δ and θ, determined by the different 
parameter values. Note that in the steady state, the same 
amount of energy is consumed on average as in the case 
P(t) = P0.  It is in the cost that we will observe a benefit to 
the control strategy. 
The cost, defined in equation (4), can be calculated for 
both case previously shown. The comparison of the total 
costs of these models allows determining if cost savings are 
indeed possible and the value of the parameters to maximize 
the savings. The cost difference is given by 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ++−+=
−=∆
ω
δ
ω
δωδ
4
)sin(
4
)2sin()cos(
2
)()()(
2
1
2
1
ttvuA
tCtCtC constfluct
,(11) 
Of all the terms in the last equation from equations 
(11), only one really matters. The coefficient A(u12 + v12)½   
is always positive, the first term t cos(δ)/2 increases or 
decreases linearly depending on the value of δ, the second 
term –sin(2ωt+δ)/4ω has a mean of zero and the last term 
sin(δ)/4ω is constant. The main contribution to the steady 
state cost savings then comes from the cosine term.  If it is 
negative, the bidding strategy will lead to cost savings that 
will grow in time.  The cosine function is negative for  
2πδπ −<≤−  and πδπ <≤2  (12)  
on the [–π, π] interval. The value of δ is given by 
( )⎥⎦
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−
−+= −
abr
abr 221tan ωωδ  , (13) 
and from the definition of the arctangent, –abr < 0 is 
necessary to ensure that δ will satisfy equation (12). Cost 
savings are thus achieved by using the control strategy and 
the cost savings will be maximized for δ = ±π, which will 
occur for  
2rab −=ω and ( )ωωω ++>> rrab
22
 . (14) 
The product ab compared to ω and r is thus of major 
importance. As can be seen from the last results, increasing 
the oscillations frequency of price ω is not sufficient to 
lower the cost, contrary to the iterative model presented 
earlier. In the case of the continuous model, it is not possible 
to skip (i.e., not respond to) a price period. The price drives 
all variables and they must oscillate at the same frequency. 
It is the phase shift between the price and the required 
energy quantity that creates the cost savings; by storing heat 
in the building when the price is high, energy can be bought 
at its lowest price. The correct determination of the 
parameters of the system will enable the larger cost savings. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
It is very important to keep in mind that the continuous 
model does have serious limitations when trying to describe 
the discrete behavior of individual loads, but the insights 
gained are nonetheless important.  So it is with this caveat 
that we consider the conclusions we can draw from these 
results. 
The main conclusion of the result is that the 
implementation of a market-based electrical system will 
yield different cost-savings depending on the relative rate of 
the market price changes and the intrinsic parameters of the 
buildings included in the system.  However simple they 
might be, they highlight the importance of carefully 
studying the market price evolution in terms of the high 
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frequency it presents to loads and the intrinsic parameters of 
the buildings (insulation, heat capacity, equipment size, etc.) 
before choosing the bidding strategy for increasing cost 
savings.   
All the results presented in this report deal with 
sinusoidal price evolutions. This is the easiest comparison to 
a constant price system, but all the results can be easily 
generalized to deal with more than one oscillating period. 
The basic results stay the same; the relationship between the 
period of price fluctuations, the intrinsic parameters of the 
building and the bidding strategy will dictate the cost-
efficiency of the market-based system. As long as there are 
price fluctuations, steady-state cost savings are possible. 
However, the presented results all considered that the 
system reaches a steady state. Abrupt changes in market 
behavior, such as abnormal spiking known to occur, lead to 
significant transient cost differences that can be either 
negative or positive, depending on their timing. These 
events will play an important role in the overall performance 
of the bidding strategy and further studies are required to 
quantify their effect in relation to the design of the building 
energy management systems.  
It is also important to note that the inclusion of an 
effective price forecaster in the bidding strategy could be 
used to further increase the cost savings. If the occurrence of 
these events could be foreseen, probably even with relative 
precision, it would be possible to take advantage of them to 
either store heat in advance if the price will go up or wait 
until they occur to buy more energy if the price goes down.  
However, the efficient market hypothesis suggests that the 
benefit of forecasters diminishes as they become more 
widely used.  It seems more likely that an efficient load 
forecaster would be beneficial, and would suffer less from 
the effect of broad application in power markets. 
Clearly, the speed at which the market iterates sets an 
upper limit on the highest frequency that can drive the loads.  
The rate at which the bidding system will be updated is 
therefore very important. Machines need to be able to bid at 
a frequency high enough so that they can take advantage of 
fast price fluctuations. Knowing the parameters of the 
building and system, that rate can be approximated from the 
models shown before. Rates as fast as 5 minutes should be 
possible, as evidenced by the operation of the NYISO hub 
and zone markets, which updates its prices at this rate. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
We have shown that a simple control strategy for 
building energy management systems can result in an 
overall cost reduction when responding to real-time power 
prices.  The key parameters that determine the savings are 
the frequency at which the market is cleared, the building’s 
heating and cooling time-constants, and the willingness of 
the building occupants to accept temperature fluctuations.  
We have quantified the conditions for which cost-savings 
can be obtained and observed that these conditions are 
possible for today’s buildings if suitable real-time power 
markets were available. 
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